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UNDERSTANDING THE REHNQUIST COURT: AN ADMIRING 
REPLY TO PROFESSOR MERRILL 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Thomas W. Merrill’s stunning article does a masterful job of 
summarizing the last sixteen years of constitutional law.  His analysis is both 
provocative and convincing.  He successfully demonstrates that there have 
been shifts in the Supreme Court’s approach over the course of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure and applies various theories developed by political 
scientists to explain the decisions of the Rehnquist Court. 
While I disagree with little in Professor Merrill’s paper, I think it is 
incomplete in a few important respects.  First, although Professor Merrill is 
certainly correct that there have been two Rehnquist Courts, he fails to 
acknowledge that a key difference between the two has been the shift from a 
Court that professed deference to the elected branches of government to one 
that shows little such deference.  In its first years, the Rehnquist Court 
invalidated few laws and professed an approach to constitutional law that 
exalted majoritarianism.  In the last decade, however, the Court has invalidated 
statutes at an unprecedented rate and has rarely deferred to Congress, to the 
Executive, to state legislatures or to state courts. 
This shift has important implications for how academics and the public 
think and talk about the Court.  Although conservative politicians still rail 
against liberal activism, the reality is that the recent and current activism—as 
measured by invalidated laws and overruling precedent—is all in a 
conservative direction.  A crucial question for the coming years will be how 
academics and politicians respond to this.  Will liberals become the advocates 
of judicial restraint?  Will conservatives develop a new rhetoric defending 
activist judges? 
Second, Professor Merrill fails to recognize areas in which the Rehnquist 
Court has been consistent.  In describing “two Rehnquist Courts,” Professor 
Merrill overlooks important areas in which there have not been shifts in 
decisions or ideology.  From its inception, the Rehnquist Court has consistently 
 
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, 
University of Southern California. 
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been hostile to civil rights plaintiffs.  In the early years of the Rehnquist 
Court—most notably in decisions from October Term 1988—there were many 
rulings that greatly narrowed the scope of civil rights laws.1  In the last few 
years, there similarly has been a series of important decisions restricting the 
protections of civil rights laws.2  Furthermore, throughout its existence, the 
Rehnquist Court has consistently ruled against criminal defendants and in 
favor of the government.  Yet, quite strikingly, Professor Merrill omits 
criminal procedure cases from his analysis. 
Lastly, my one area of disagreement with Professor Merrill is in his claim 
that the Rehnquist Court has addressed fewer “social” issues in its second 
phase.  Certainly, Professor Merrill is correct that the latter era of the 
Rehnquist Court is most notable for the many federalism decisions narrowing 
the scope of Congress’s powers and expanding the protections of state 
sovereign immunity.  It is incorrect, however, to imply that constitutional 
social issues—such as abortion, affirmative action, the death penalty, gay 
rights, school desegregation, and aid to religion—have receded during the 
second Rehnquist Court. 
Coherently describing sixteen years of Supreme Court decisions is an 
inherently elusive, if not impossible, task.3  Any pattern that can be identified 
has notable exceptions.  Yet, overall, there can be no doubt that the sixteen 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (limiting the 
ability to prove disparate impact in employment discrimination cases); Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).  These, and 
other decisions, were overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071. 
 2. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding there to be no private 
right of action to enforce regulations under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that prohibit 
recipients of federal funds from engaging in practices with a racially discriminatory impact); 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding the Federal Arbitration Act to 
require arbitration of state law employment discrimination claims); Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (holding that to be a 
“prevailing party” under an attorney’s fees statute, it is not sufficient that the plaintiff in a lawsuit 
is a catalyst for legislative action; there must be court-ordered relief, via a judgment or consent 
decree). 
 3. Professor Merrill’s lecture is descriptive rather than normative, and that is my focus as 
well.  My goal in this essay is to supplement Professor Merrill’s description, not to criticize 
normatively the Rehnquist Court’s decisions.  For example, in my first point—that the Rehnquist 
Court has shifted away from deference to the other branches of government—I do not mean to 
imply that this shift is inherently good or bad.  Likewise, in my third point—that the Rehnquist 
Court has not lessened its attention to constitutional social issues—I intend no implication as to 
whether this is normatively desirable.  My second point—that the Court has been consistently 
hostile to civil rights plaintiffs and to criminal defendants—obviously implies more of a 
normative judgment.  Yet, in this response, I simply hope to show that the Rehnquist Court has 
been quite consistent in its rulings against civil rights plaintiffs and in favor of the government in 
criminal cases.  I do not criticize the decisions, but instead seek to describe their orientation. 
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years of the Rehnquist Court have seen the substantial triumph of conservative 
ideology in constitutional law.  When William Rehnquist joined the Supreme 
Court in 1971, he was a fierce advocate for restricting Congress’s powers, for 
limiting the rights of criminal defendants (especially by narrowing the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus), and for allowing much greater aid to 
religion.  In all of these areas, and many more, Rehnquist’s philosophy has 
prevailed.  As the Rehnquist era nears its completion, there can be little doubt 
that William Rehnquist was enormously successful—perhaps as much as any 
Chief Justice in history—in shaping constitutional law to his ideological 
vision. 
II.  THE SHIFT FROM JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Thirteen years ago, I was invited to write the Foreword to the November 
1989 Harvard Law Review.4  October Term 1988, the focus of my Foreword, 
was marked by an exceptional number of important rulings, such as those 
narrowing abortion rights,5 limiting affirmative action,6 striking down laws 
prohibiting flag burning,7 and curtailing the availability of habeas corpus 
relief.8  In reading the decisions of that Term, I was struck by the Court’s 
overwhelming deference to the elected branches of government.  I wrote: 
  The Court’s desire to avoid judicial value impositions combined with its 
commitment to deferring to majoritarian decisionmaking produces a sweeping 
judicial deference.  The Court’s inability to develop a theory of interpretation 
consistent with its premises—a theory for when it should accept constitutional 
claims and hold against the government—leaves the Court in a very deferential 
posture. 
  Thus, one obvious consequence of the Court’s jurisprudence is that the 
government generally wins constitutional cases.9 
Statistics supported this conclusion of a highly deferential Court and 
especially that the conservative Justices were particularly loathe to strike down 
actions taken by the elected branches of government: 
 
 4. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Forward: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989). 
 5. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding Missouri’s regulation 
of abortions with four Justices strongly indicating a desire to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)). 
 6. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a city’s plan 
requiring contractors to subcontract at least 30% of its public works’ money for minority owned 
businesses). 
 7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state law prohibiting flag 
burning). 
 8. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that a habeas petition may rely on a new 
rule of constitutional law only if it would be applied retroactively). 
 9. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 56-57. 
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For example, in forty-seven non-unanimous decisions in constitutional cases 
during the 1988-1989 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted against the 
government only twice.  Similarly, in non-unanimous cases, Justice Kennedy 
voted against the government only five times.  The government prevailed in 
seventy-nine percent of the non-unanimous decisions in constitutional cases 
before the Supreme Court [that] Term.10 
Examining all constitutional decisions, both unanimous and non-unanimous, 
the government won 66% of the constitutional cases in the 1988-1989 Term.11  
In contrast, twenty years earlier, in the 1968-1969 Term—the last year of the 
Warren Court—the government prevailed in only 23% of constitutional 
decisions.12 
My Foreword described how a majoritarian paradigm had come to 
dominate constitutional law and lamented what this meant for the protection of 
individual liberties and the advancement of equality.  Nor was this judicial 
deference a one-year phenomenon.  A year later, for example, the Supreme 
Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith,13 tremendously limited the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and provided for great judicial deference to government 
actions burdening religion. 
The second Rehnquist Court—as Professor Merrill calls it—has been 
marked by a dramatic lack of deference to Congress or the states.  Former 
Solicitor General Seth Waxman observed that: 
During the entire first 200 years following ratification of the Constitution, only 
127 federal laws were struck down—even accounting for the many laws that 
fell victim to the New Deal’s head-on collision with the Supreme Court in the 
tumultuous 1930s. 
  These days, however, the extraordinary act of one branch of government 
declaring that the other two branches have violated the Constitution has 
become almost commonplace.  Since 1995, the Court has invalidated twenty-
six different federal enactments . . . .14 
The Court’s lack of deference to Congress is most evident in the 
federalism decisions, in which the Court has invalidated laws as exceeding the 
scope of the Commerce Clause,15 narrowed the scope of Congress’s power 
 
 10. Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by neutral 
laws of general applicability). 
 14. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2001). 
 15. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages provision 
of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding the scope of the commerce power); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act). 
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under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 revived the Tenth 
Amendment as a constraint on federal power,17 and expanded the scope of 
sovereign immunity to limit the enforcement of federal statutes.18 
Nor is the current Rehnquist Court one that defers to state legislatures.  As 
Professor Merrill notes, the Court frequently finds state laws preempted by 
federal law.19  One would imagine that a Court committed to states’ rights 
would narrow the preemptive scope of federal law, but this has not been the 
case for the Rehnquist Court.  Also, the Court has recently invalidated many 
state laws as violating the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech 
and association.20  Indeed, in recent cases striking down restrictions on speech 
by judicial candidates and ruling in favor of the Boy Scouts’ ability to exclude 
gays despite a state law prohibiting such discrimination, the Court was split 
five-four with the five most conservative Justices ruling against the state law.  
Nor after Bush v. Gore21 can it credibly be claimed that the five most 
conservative Justices show deference to state courts. 
My point here is simply that Professor Merrill is correct that there have 
been two Rehnquist Courts, but he omits a key way in which they have been 
different: the first Rehnquist Court stressed deference to the elected branches 
of government; the subsequent Rehnquist Court shows little such deference.  In 
the first Rehnquist Court, relatively few federal or state laws were struck 
down.  Now, it is far more likely that the Court will invalidate such statutes. 
This is important because of its significance for academic and political 
rhetoric about the Court.  For a half-century, conservatives have argued for 
judicial restraint—defined as judicial deference to the majoritarian branches.  
Now, however, the judicial activism—defined as a willingness to invalidate 
laws—is all from the right.  By any measure, the Court’s federalism decisions 
constitute judicial activism.  Sixty years of precedent broadly interpreting the 
 
 16. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act). 
 17. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the provision of a 
federal law requiring that state and local law enforcement perform background checks before 
issuing permits for firearms); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a 
federal law requiring that states clean up their nuclear wastes). 
 18. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that 
state governments cannot be sued for violating Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state governments cannot be sued 
for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 19. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 612 n.159 (2003). 
 20. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating a state 
law prohibiting judicial candidates from expressing views about disputed legal or political 
issues); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invalidating the application of a state 
public accommodation law to force the Boy Scouts to accept a gay man as a scout leader). 
 21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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commerce power has been discarded in favor of a much narrower approach.  
The Court’s sovereign immunity decisions—affording broad protection for 
state governments from being sued in state court or in federal agency 
proceedings—have no support based on the text of the Constitution or judicial 
precedent.22 
In light of this shift, it is interesting to speculate as to whether there will be 
a major shift in academic and political discourse about the courts.  Will 
progressives turn against the courts and argue against judicial review?  Mark 
Tushnet’s provocative book, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,23 
and the “popular constitutionalism” scholarship24 are indications that this may 
be happening and that liberals are losing faith in judicial review.  Perhaps this 
is part of a major shift that will see a return to the rhetoric of the first third of 
the twentieth century, when during the Lochner era it was conservatives who 
defended aggressive judicial review and liberals who proclaimed the need for 
judicial deference and restraint. 
Such a shift, though, poses difficult choices for each side of the debate.  
For progressives, the reality is that courts are the only institution likely to 
uphold civil rights claims by unpopular individuals, such as prisoners.  Turning 
against the courts leaves little hope for many of those whose rights 
progressives have long sought to protect.  For conservatives, however, 
embracing judicial review robs them of their arguments against Court 
decisions protecting non-textual constitutional rights, such as abortion.  The 
traditional conservative approach of challenging the legitimacy of non-
originalist judicial review is far more difficult when conservative judges 
regularly engage in the practice. 
This is the landscape for the debate over the courts in election campaigns, 
in judicial confirmation fights, and in scholarly literature.  Professor Merrill 
omits an important distinction between the first and the second Rehnquist 
Courts by not addressing this difference. 
III.  THE CONSISTENCY OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 
The central thesis of Professor Merrill’s article is that there have been two 
Rehnquist Courts or, in other words, that the Rehnquist Court from 1986 to 
1994 often acted differently than the Rehnquist Court from 1994 to the present.  
I agree with this observation, but I believe it is an overgeneralization that 
masks areas in which the Rehnquist Court has been quite consistent throughout 
its history.  Most notably, the Rehnquist Court, from its inception to the 
 
 22. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state governments cannot 
be sued in state court, even on federal claims, without their consent). 
 23. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 24. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Forward: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
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present, has been quite hostile to civil rights plaintiffs and strongly inclined to 
rule in favor of the government in criminal cases.  Although in some important 
areas—such as federalism and the degree of judicial deference—there have 
been important shifts, it is important to note the ways in which the Rehnquist 
Court has been very consistent in key areas such as civil rights and criminal 
law. 
A. Civil Rights 
One of the most important and consistent themes about the Rehnquist 
Court has been its continual hostility to civil rights claims.  Simply put, one of 
the best predictors of the Rehnquist Court since its inception is that civil rights 
plaintiffs lose.  This is true in both constitutional and statutory civil rights 
cases. 
For example, during both time periods that Professor Merrill identifies, the 
Rehnquist Court has sought to end federal school desegregation orders.  In 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School 
District No. 89 v. Dowell,25 the issue was whether a desegregation order should 
continue when its end would mean a resegregation of the public schools.  In 
Dowell, Oklahoma schools had once been segregated under a state law 
mandating separation of the races.26  A federal court order, however, had 
successfully desegregated the Oklahoma City public schools.27  Yet, despite 
the fact that evidence presented in the case showed that ending the 
desegregation order would result in resegregation,28 the Supreme Court held 
that once a “unitary” school system had been achieved, a federal court’s 
desegregation order should end even if it would mean resegregation of the 
schools.29 
The Court did not define “unitary system” with any specificity.  Instead, 
the Court simply stated that the desegregation decree should be ended if the 
board “had complied in good faith” and “the vestiges of past discrimination 
had been eliminated to the extent practicable.”30  In evaluating this, the Court 
indicated that “the District Court should look not only at student assignments, 
but ‘to every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, transportation, extra-
curricular activities and facilities.’”31 
 
 25. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 26. Id. at 240. 
 27. Id. at 241. 
 28. See id. at 262-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 29. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50. 
 30. Id. at 249-50. 
 31. Id. at 250 (quoting Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 
(1968)). 
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In Freeman v. Pitts,32 the Supreme Court held that a federal court 
desegregation order may end when it is complied with, even if other 
desegregation orders for the same school system remain in place.  As in 
Dowell, a federal district court had ordered desegregation of various aspects of 
a Georgia school system that previously had been segregated by law.33  Part of 
the desegregation plan had been met—the school system had achieved 
desegregation in pupil assignment and in facilities.34  Another aspect of the 
desegregation order, however, which concerned teacher and principal 
assignments, had not yet been fulfilled.35  Nevertheless, the Court held that 
once a portion of a desegregation order has been met, the federal court may 
cease its efforts as to that part and remain involved only as to those aspects of 
the plan that have not yet been achieved.36 
Dowell and Freeman were decided in 1991 and 1992 respectively, during 
the era that Professor Merrill describes as the first Rehnquist Court.  The 
Court’s desire to end desegregation orders continued during the second 
Rehnquist Court.  In 1995, in Missouri v. Jenkins,37 the Court ordered an end 
to a school desegregation order for the Kansas City, Missouri schools.  In an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court ruled in favor of the state on 
every issue.  The Court held that the continued disparity in student test scores 
did not justify continuance of the federal court’s desegregation order.38  The 
Court concluded that the Constitution requires equal opportunity, not any 
particular result; therefore, disparity between African-American and white 
students on standardized tests was not a sufficient basis for concluding that 
desegregation had not been achieved.39  The Supreme Court held that once a 
desegregation order is complied with, the federal court effort should be 
ended.40  Disparity in test scores was not a basis for continued federal court 
involvement.41 
 
 32. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 33. Id. at 472-73. 
 34. Id. at 474. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 490-91; see also id. at 497-98. 
 37. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).  Earlier, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), the Supreme 
Court ruled that a federal district court could order that a local taxing body increase taxes to pay 
for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should not itself order an 
increase in the taxes. 
 38. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 100. 
 39. Id. at 101. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 101-02. 
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These Rehnquist Court decisions have led to a large number of lower court 
cases ending desegregation orders.42  The result has been a profound 
resegregation of public schools, especially in the South.43 
The Rehnquist Court’s hostility to civil rights claims has been especially 
evident with regard to its approach to civil rights statutes.  As Professor Merrill 
notes, in 1989, there was a series of Supreme Court decisions very narrowly 
interpreting federal civil rights statutes.44  These decisions prompted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,45 which overruled the Court’s interpretations by revising 
the civil rights laws.  For example, in Wards Cove Packing Co.  v. Atonio,46 the 
Court made it much more difficult for a plaintiff to recover in an employment 
discrimination case by proving racially disparate impact.  In Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union,47 the Court held that the prohibition of race 
discrimination in contracting, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, applied only to the 
formation of contracts; racial harassment after hiring was not deemed 
actionable under the law. 
The Court’s hostility to statutory civil rights claims have continued 
unabated through the Rehnquist Court’s second phase.  Consider, for example, 
the decisions of the last two years concerning statutory civil rights claims.  In 
October Term 2000, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,48 the Court held that state governments cannot be sued for 
employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  In Alexander v. Sandoval,49 the Court ruled that there is not a 
private right of action to enforce the regulations to Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibits recipients of federal funds from engaging in 
practices that have a racially discriminatory impact.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams50 declared that the Federal Arbitration Act requires arbitration of state 
law discrimination claims when there are contractual provisions calling for 
arbitration of employment related disputes.  In Booth v. Churner,51 the Court 
 
 42. See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 
2001); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 43. Erwin Chemerinsky, Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Schools: The 
Court’s Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences 
of a Decade of Resegregation (July 2001), at http://www.civilrightsproject. 
harvard.edu/research/deseg/separate_schools01.php (last visited March 12, 2003). 
 44. Merrill, supra note 19, at 626 n.221. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 46. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 47. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 48. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 49. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 50. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 51. 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requirement for 
exhaustion of administrative remedies applies when a prisoner is seeking monetary relief and the 
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held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that a prisoner seeking 
money damages exhaust prison administrative remedies, even if they cannot 
provide such a remedy, so long as they can offer the prisoner something of 
value.  Saucier v. Katz52 held that a police officer can be deemed protected by 
qualified immunity, even where there is a jury finding that the officer used 
excessive force. 
Quite significantly, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,53 the Court made it 
much more difficult for successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees.  The 
Court held that a plaintiff is not deemed to “prevail” just because his or her 
lawsuit is the “catalyst” for the government to change its policy.54  Attorneys’ 
fees are to be awarded only when there is a judicial action—a judgment or 
consent decree—in favor of the plaintiff.55 
Individually, each of these rulings is likely to be important in civil rights 
litigation.  Cumulatively, they are an astounding number of anti-civil rights 
rulings for a single Term.  Yet, it was not an aberrational year.  In October 
Term 2001, the Court held that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Federal 
Educational Records and Privacy Act;56 that punitive damages are not 
available in actions under Title VI, the Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans 
with Disabilities Act;57 that individual prisoners must exhaust administrative 
remedies when complaining of the use of excessive force by prison guards;58 
and that state governments cannot be sued in federal agency proceedings.59 
I do not want to overstate this; there have been some victories for civil 
rights plaintiffs, such as in Easley v. Cromartie,60 which made it easier for the 
government to use race in drawing election districts to benefit minorities, and 
 
grievance procedure does not permit recovery of money, as long as the grievance process can 
provide some responsive action). 
 52. 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that in a civil rights case alleging constitutionally 
excessive force the tests for qualified immunity and reasonableness are distinct; a finding of 
excessive force does not preclude a finding of qualified immunity). 
 53. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 605-06. 
 55. Id. at 604. 
 56. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 57. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 
 58. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (holding that the exhaustion provision of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies 
before filing action alleging use of excessive force by corrections officer). 
 59. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (finding that 
Congress, by statute, may not authorize the Federal Maritime Commission to adjudicate 
complaints filed by a private person against state-run ports; statutory provision permitting 
adjudication of such complaints is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.). 
 60. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).  The district court in Easley was clearly erroneous in finding that 
voting district lines were drawn primarily based on race.  Drawing lines primarily for political 
purposes, even if it correlates with race, does not trigger strict scrutiny. 
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again in Hope v. Pelzer,61 which held that there need not be a case on point to 
deny a government officer qualified immunity.  In the overwhelming majority 
of civil rights cases, however, the Rehnquist Court—in both its first and its 
second phases—has ruled against civil rights plaintiffs.  Professor Merrill’s 
insights about the two phases of the Rehnquist Court should not obscure this 
crucial, consistent characteristic of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure. 
B. Criminal Procedure 
Another consistent feature of the Rehnquist Court has been its strong 
likelihood of ruling in favor of the government in criminal procedure cases.  
Generally, criminal defendants have lost before both the first and second 
Rehnquist Courts.  For example, the Court has consistently sought to narrow 
the availability of habeas corpus relief for prisoners.  In 1989, in Teague v. 
Lane,62 the Court imposed a significant new limit on the availability of relief 
under habeas corpus: habeas petitions could be heard only if they relied on 
already existing constitutional principles; “new rules” could be raised on 
habeas corpus only in the rare circumstances that they would apply 
retroactively.  Furthermore, in McCleskey v. Zant,63 the Court ruled that 
successive habeas petitions were not allowed unless the petitioner could 
demonstrate either cause and prejudice or actual innocence. 
In 1996, Congress greatly restricted the availability of habeas corpus relief 
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.64  Since then, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute expansively to limit habeas corpus 
relief.  For example, in Tyler v. Cain,65 the Court held that a habeas petition 
cannot be heard—even if a person was clearly unconstitutionally convicted—
unless the Supreme Court holds that its prior decision applies retroactively. 
The Fourth Amendment is another area in which criminal defendants have 
lost throughout the Rehnquist Court.  In 1989, for instance, the Court upheld 
drug courier profiles66 and searches by airplanes flying below permissible 
limits.67  In the last couple of years, the Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of arresting a person for a traffic violation that has no possibility of a prison 
sentence,68 stops of motorists based only on innocuous factors,69 and searches 
 
 61. 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (holding that police officers are not protected by qualified immunity 
when they tie a prisoner to a hitching post because officers should have been on notice that this 
conduct was unconstitutional, even though there were no cases on point finding it to be such). 
 62. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 63. 499 U.S. 467 (1991). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 65. 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
 66. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 67. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 68. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 69. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
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of bus passengers without meaningful consent.70  These, of course, are only a 
few examples of Fourth Amendment rulings.  Numerous other Fourth 
Amendment cases from both phases of the Rehnquist Court could be 
identified, as could rulings involving other constitutional rights in which 
criminal defendants have lost.  Again, I do not want to overstate this.  In 
Dickerson v. United States,71 the Court did not overrule Miranda v. Arizona,72 
and in Apprendi v. New Jersey,73 the Court protected the right to trial by jury 
by holding that any factor other than a prior conviction that leads to a sentence 
greater than the statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
to the jury.  Overall, though, no one would disagree that the Rehnquist Court 
throughout its existence has overwhelmingly sided with the government and 
ruled against criminal defendants in criminal procedure cases. 
IV.  HAS THE REHNQUIST COURT SHIFTED AWAY FROM SOCIAL ISSUES? 
I disagree with one claim that Professor Merrill makes: that the “second” 
Rehnquist Court has focused less on social issues than did the first era of the 
Rehnquist Court.  Professor Merrill writes that during the second Rehnquist 
Court: 
Social issues like abortion, affirmative action, and school prayer have 
significantly receded from the scene.  Instead, the dominant theme of the 
second Rehnquist Court has been constitutional federalism, including the scope 
of federal power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Tenth Amendment limitations on federal power, and state 
sovereign immunity from private lawsuits reflected in the Eleventh 
Amendment.74 
I do not dispute the importance of the federalism decisions of the last seven 
years, but I do disagree with his claim that social issues have receded. 
Professor Merrill spends several pages developing this conclusion.75  He 
defines social issues cases as: 
[those] involving constitutional protection of abortion, other privacy rights 
such as parental rights and the right to die, affirmative action, gay rights, and 
government speech on religious topics (for example, school prayer and crèches 
in city hall).  These are the “culture war” issues that sharply divide liberal 
urban elites and the predominately rural and suburban religious right.76 
 
 70. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 71. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 73. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 74. Merrill, supra note 19, at 570. 
 75. Id. at 580-87. 
 76. Id. at 580. 
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Is Professor Merrill correct that the first Rehnquist Court focused on these 
issues more than the second?  Examining each of the areas he lists reveals that 
the shift that Professor Merrill describes has not happened.  I consider below 
each area individually, leaving abortion for last. 
Privacy rights such as parental rights and the right to die.  It is interesting 
to note that the Court decided one important parental rights case and one 
significant right to die case during what Professor Merrill labels as the first 
Rehnquist Court and did exactly the same during the second Rehnquist Court.  
With regard to parental rights, in 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,77 the 
Supreme Court significantly limited the rights of non-married fathers.  The 
Supreme Court held that even an unmarried father who participated actively in 
the child’s life is not entitled to due process if the mother was married to 
someone else.78  Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that a state may create 
an irrebuttable presumption that a married woman’s husband is the father of 
her child even though it negates all of the biological father’s rights.79 
The Rehnquist Court’s only other decision with regard to parental rights 
was not until 2000—clearly within Professor Merrill’s second Rehnquist Court 
era.  In Troxel v. Granville,80 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
Washington state statute that protected grandparents’ rights.  The Court held 
that a court order for grandparent visitation over a competent mother’s 
objection violated the parent’s right to control the upbringing of her children.81 
Likewise, the Rehnquist Court has spoken on two occasions about the right 
to die—once in 1990 and again in 1997—spanning the two eras of the 
Rehnquist Court that Professor Merrill identifies.  In Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,82 the Court held that competent adults have 
the right to refuse medical treatment, that a state may require clear and 
convincing evidence that a person wanted life-sustaining treatment ended, and 
that a state may prevent family members from terminating treatment for 
another. 
In the 1997 decisions of Washington v. Glucksberg83 and Vacco v. Quill,84 
the Supreme Court held that there is not a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide.  In other words, the frequency of decisions concerning privacy 
rights has been identical in the two phases of the Rehnquist Court. 
Affirmative action.  Similarly, there has been no decrease in affirmative 
action cases during the second Rehnquist Court compared to the first.  There 
 
 77. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 129. 
 79. Id. at 129-30. 
 80. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 81. Id. at 75. 
 82. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 83. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 84. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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were a number of major affirmative action cases during the first phase of the 
Rehnquist Court, including: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,85 Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,86 and Shaw v. Reno.87 
However, there have been even more affirmative action cases during the 
second Rehnquist Court.  For example, there have been a large number of 
cases applying and clarifying when race may be used in drawing election 
districts: Miller v. Johnson,88 Shaw v. Hunt,89 Bush v. Vera,90 and Easley v. 
Cromartie.91  Additionally, the second Rehnquist Court decided a major case 
concerning the appropriate level of scrutiny for federal affirmative action—
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.92  Moreover, in December 2002, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases involving the permissibility of 
affirmative action in college and law school admissions.93  Thus, there is no 
basis for concluding that affirmative action cases are less frequent during the 
second Rehnquist Court. 
Gay rights.  There were no gay rights cases during the first Rehnquist 
Court.  Bowers v. Hardwick94 was decided in 1986—the last year of the Burger 
Court.  In contrast, there have been two major gay rights cases during the 
second era of the Rehnquist Court and another is pending this Term.  In 1996, 
in Romer v. Evans,95 the Court struck down a Colorado initiative that repealed 
all laws in the state protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and that 
prohibited the enactment of any new anti-discrimination statutes and 
ordinances.  In 2000, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,96 the Court ruled that 
the Boy Scouts had a constitutional right to exclude a gay scout leader even 
though it violated a state law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by 
private entities. 
In December 2002, the Court granted certiorari in Lawrence v. Texas.97  
The issue is whether a state law prohibiting oral and anal sex between same 
 
 85. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a city’s plan requiring contractors to subcontract at 
least 30% of its public works’ money for minority owned businesses). 
 86. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding a preference for minority owned businesses in federal 
broadcast licensing). 
 87. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that the use of race in drawing election districts so as to 
benefit historical minorities must meet strict scrutiny). 
 88. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 89. 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
 90. 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
 91. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 92. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 93. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 
617 (2002); Gratz v. Bollinger, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002). 
 94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 95. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 96. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 97. 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002). 
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sex couples is constitutional.  The Court is being asked to consider whether 
this violates equal protection and whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be 
overruled.  Obviously, gay rights have been much more important during the 
second phase of the Rehnquist Court. 
Religion.  Professor Merrill only mentions religious speech, such as 
prayers and nativity scenes.  It is unclear why he excludes aid to religion from 
his list of social issues; this clearly would fit within that list.  One of the most 
important developments in constitutional law during the second Rehnquist 
Court era has been a substantial relaxation of the rules on the government’s 
ability to give aid to parochial schools.  In Agostini v. Felton,98 Mitchell v. 
Helms,99 and, most recently, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,100 the Court has 
allowed public school teachers to provide instruction in parochial schools, the 
government to supply instructional equipment to parochial schools, and 
vouchers to be used in parochial schools.  In contrast, there was only one 
decision concerning aid to parochial schools during the first Rehnquist Court 
era: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,101 which allowed the 
government to provide sign-language interpreters for hearing impaired students 
in parochial schools. 
Nor is Professor Merrill correct if the focus is on school prayer and 
religious symbols on government property.  There was one major school 
prayer case during the first Rehnquist Court era, Lee v. Weisman,102 and one 
during the second Rehnquist Court, Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe.103  Similarly, there was one major decision concerning religious symbols 
on government property during the first Rehnquist Court, County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU,104 and one in the second phase, Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Board v. Pinette.105 
Abortion rights.  The one area in which Professor Merrill is correct that 
there have been fewer Supreme Court decisions is abortion rights.  Even here, 
though, it is not a significant difference.  In the first phase of the Rehnquist 
Court, there were two high profile abortion decisions: Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services106 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
 
 98. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 99. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 100. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 101. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 102. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting clergy-delivered prayers at public middle-school 
graduations). 
 103. 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting student-delivered prayers prior to public high school 
football games). 
 104. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (requiring that religious symbols be accompanied by symbols from 
more than one religion and secular symbols). 
 105. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 106. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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Casey.107  There also were significant rulings affecting aspects of abortion 
rights, such as restrictions on recipients of federal funds to provide abortion 
counseling and referrals108 and requirements for parental notice and consent for 
unmarried minors’ abortions.109 
During the second Rehnquist Court, there has been only one major 
abortion decision: Stenberg v. Carhart,110 which declared unconstitutional a 
state law prohibiting so-called “partial birth abortions.”  There have been, 
however, several Supreme Court decisions during this latter time period 
considering restrictions of speech outside abortion clinics.111  There also have 
been several Supreme Court rulings on the ability of states to regulate how 
abortions are performed.112 
Thus, there has not been a significant drop-off in the number of abortion 
cases over the two eras of the Rehnquist Court.  Yet, Professor Merrill is surely 
correct that abortion was a much more salient constitutional issue for the 
Rehnquist Court in its first phase.  Webster, in 1989, suggested a Court on the 
verge of overruling Roe v. Wade,113 and Casey, in 1992, surprised many by 
reaffirming the basic holding of Roe.  Once Casey affirmed the right to 
abortion, the issue seemed to be resolved for the Court, at least until there is a 
change in the Court’s membership.  As Professor Merrill points out, the 
continuity on the Court lessens the need for judicial review on an issue such as 
abortion because each Justice’s views are known to the others and there is no 
uncertainty about the likely outcome.114 
It is wrong, however, to infer that the Rehnquist Court has shied away 
from social issues because it is deciding fewer abortion cases.  Indeed, I 
believe that one of the misconceptions about the Rehnquist Court generally is 
to see it as less conservative than it actually is because the Court has not 
overruled Roe v. Wade or the school prayer decisions.  Looking at civil rights 
cases, criminal procedural decisions, affirmative action rulings, and aid to 
religion decisions shows that, overall, the Rehnquist Court, in both its first and 
second phases, has been very conservative. 
 
 107. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 108. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding restrictions on recipients of federal 
funds). 
 109. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417 (1990). 
 110. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 111. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. 
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 112. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (providing summary reversal of a 
decision invalidating a state’s parental consent law); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) 
(providing summary reversal of a court of appeals decision invalidating a state law requiring that 
a physician be present when an abortion is performed). 
 113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 114. Merrill, supra note 19, at 645-48. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
With the resignation of Chief Justice Rehnquist expected within the next 
year or two, the Rehnquist Court is nearing its completion.  Overall, the 
Rehnquist Court has seen the triumph of conservative ideology in most areas 
of constitutional law.  Relying on theories developed by political scientists, 
Professor Merrill offers a compelling explanation for the Rehnquist Court’s 
decisions.  In the end, however, the best explanation is the simplest: the 
Rehnquist Court has had a consistent majority of conservative Justices, and 
with overwhelming frequency they have ruled in a conservative direction. 
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